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Thinking Outside the Box: Property Rights
as a Key to Environmental Protection
ROBERT H. CUTTING and LAWRENCE B. CAHOON*
Professor Oliver Houck wrote in Science that the promise of in-
corporating objective science into environmental law and policy
has been subverted by the political system. We offer a solution
based on the property rights of receptors of pollutants, rather
than the current focus on the rights of the "generators" of pollu-
tion. Environmental law must require internalization of all
costs to the generator, as demanded by market economics, which
is difficult given the vast gaps in data (the Data Deficit). The
burden should be placed on the generator to quantify and to
demonstrate scientifically containment of all trans-boundary ef-
fects. The present systems effectively subsidize polluters by per-
mitting them to deposit waste into public and private property
and to use the population as test subjects while unconstitution-
ally taking their property rights. These hidden subsidies distort
the market by shifting costs to uncompensated receptors.
Tulane's Professor Oliver Houck argued in his critique of the
rocky marriage of science and law in environmental policy that
the promise of scientific regulation designed to protect human and
planetary health has been degraded by the political process to a
regulatory scheme that requires only the best available technolog-
ical solutions.1 The Clean Air Act (1970), for example, requires
protection of health regardless of feasibility2 and while the Clean
Water Act was in 1972 keyed to "best available technology (BAT),"
the tradeoff was that discharges to surface waters would be com-
pletely eliminated by 19853-which did not happen. Along the
way, the field of environmental law became incomprehensible to
* Robert H. Cutting J.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Environmental
Studies, UNC Wilmington and Lawrence B. Cahoon, Ph.D., Professor, Department of
Biological Sciences, UNC Wilmington.
1. Oliver Houck, Tales From A Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environ-
mental Policy, 302 Sci. 1926 (2003).
2. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
3. Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001).
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any one person.4 As Houck notes, State Implementation Plans for
air quality and new Total Maximum Daily Loading standards to
restore surface waters have become programs which, ". . .eat up
heroic amounts of money, remain information-starved, feature
shameless manipulation of the data, face crippling political pres-
sure, and produce little abatement."5
Professor Houck also cautions that science is itself influenced
by the political agenda of the time and by the funding source (con-
sider Galileo), a criticism also recently leveled by the Union of
Concerned Scientists against the current Administration. 6
We agree that because of the political influence of the "regu-
lated community" (the "agency capture" phenomenon), 7 environ-
mental law does not always require protection of public health
and the environment (the "receptors" of pollution), as promised by
the policy declarations, but focuses instead on technological feasi-
bility and cost to the generators of pollutants. Standards are ulti-
mately decided by political appointees, and the courts defer to the
agency unless the decision is clearly "arbitrary and unreasona-
ble".8 BAT is certainly better than no standards, but why stop
4. ZYGMUNT PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND
SOCIETY, p.xxvii (2d ed. 1998).
5. Houck, supra note 1, at 1928.
6. "'Science, to quote President Bush's father, the former president, relies on
freedom of inquiry and objectivity,' said Russell Train, head of the Environmental
Protection Agency under Nixon and Ford, who joined the scientists in calling for ac-
tion. 'But this administration has obstructed that freedom and distorted that objec-
tivity in ways that were unheard of in any previous administration."' Press Release,
Union of Concerned Scientists, Preeminent Scientists Protest Bush Administration's
Misuse of Science, at http://www.ucsusa.org/news/pressrelease.cfm?newsID=381
(Feb. 18, 2004).
7. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1236
(1995).
8. The U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.), for example, found that the discretion
given to EPA under the Clean Air Act (similar to most environmental acts)
§ 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2001), to set ambient air quality standards which
"...in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an
adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health," was so extensive
that it constituted an unconstitutional delegation of the power of Congress to legis-
late. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd in part,
531 U.S. 457 (2001). The Supreme Court held that the delegation of power, while very
broad, was sufficiently definite. Worse yet, agencies can simply ignore statutory com-
mands, as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did with the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899. See Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land: Three Nearly Forgot-
ten Cases that Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279, 2287-90
(1996) (describing two 1960's Supreme Court cases that resurrected the Act's prohibi-
tion on discharging "any refuse matter").
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there when the property and personal rights of receptors are at
stake?9
The politics Professor Houck spotlights has led to both a fund-
ing shortage and a lack of regulatory authority that have pre-
vented acquisition of data sufficient to run a sound regulatory
program (the "Data Deficit"). We maintain that the balance ought
to be shifted to generators to demonstrate the safety of materials
before they are introduced into the environment, much as the
FDA requires of new drugs. Instead, the Bush Administration has
just succeeded in convincing the European Economic Union to ta-
ble its new REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorization
of Chemicals) regulations that would have required more testing,
primarily because of the cost to generators. 10
The focus on technological feasibility sidesteps completely the
demand of free market economics that the complete short and
long-term costs of any goods or services must be reflected in the
price structure or there is a "market failure". Instead, generators
of pollutants use the air, water and soil as disposal sites, and some
of those materials become part of living organisms, as well. The
health effects, diminished property values and cleanup costs are
what economists call "Externalities". Politics has also hamstrung
enforcement of existing law at all levels, notwithstanding that the
President's Science Advisory Committee in 1965 found that,
". .pollution from farm animal wastes could be alleviated by vig-
orous enforcement without technological advances. The same is
true of particulate matter in air and sewage effluents in water."11
The real question is where to go next? We suggest that the
problems outlined by Professor Houck will never be overcome by a
system of regulation that does not focus on the true effects on re-
9. EPA was able to adopt only eight standards for hazardous air pollutants using
a risk-based standard, but standards are mandated for some 178 air pollutants per
the deal that delivered the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990-with "available tech-
nology" limitations on those standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2001); 40 C.F.R. pt. 61
(2004).
10. Press Release, European Union in the U.S., REACH/Chemicals: EU Spokes-
man Anthony Gooch's Statement on the Waxman Report: "A Special Interest Case
Study: The Chemical Industry, the Bush Administration and European Efforts to
Regulate Chemicals," at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/20040054.htm
(Apr. 5, 2004).
11. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PANEL, PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE, RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT, 1-2, 5-7, 10-15 (1965); see, e.g., R.
Steven Brown, When the Axe Falls - How State Environmental Agencies Deal with
Budget Cuts, Environmental Council of States (2002), at http://www.sso.org/ecos/
ECOStatesArticles/Ecostates%2OSteve's%20budget%20articles/when%20the%20axe
%20falls-%202002.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
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ceptors. Rather than attempt to address all the inherent flaws in
the political process, from campaign finance reform to the budget
battles, why not look "outside the box" of the current system for a
solution or at least a new method to visualize a solution? We
think that generators ought to utilize sound science to quantify
proposed activity, with a "bright-line" test based on the property
rights of receptors.12
-- PROPERTY LINE
X - WASTE DISPOSALAREA
y- WASTE WATER DISPOSAL a
The political institutions and the Property Rights Movement
since the Industrial Revolution have honed in on the rights within
private property boundaries (the "generators"), to the exclusion of
the rights of those outside those boundaries (the "receptors"). This
has created a classic, "can't see the forest for the trees" scenario,
and we suggest that the field of vision ought to be broadened to
include: 1) the rights of all receptors (landowners and lawful oc-
12. Robert H. Cutting, One Man's Ceilin' is Another Man's Floor: Property Rights
as the Double-Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L. 819 (2001).
[Vol. 22
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss1/3
THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX
cupiers, public or private) to be free of the effects of pollution ("ex-
ternalities"), and 2) the responsibility of all generators of
environmental alteration to safeguard those rights. To para-
phrase George Carlin: "You should keep your stuff in your
space." 13 Any alteration of nature must (in addition to any other
onsite regulations) be contained within the three-dimensional con-
struct of the property boundaries. This methodology directly in-
ternalizes all potential off-site effects of any action. The burden
should be on the generator to identify, and to contain or mitigate,
all trans-boundary effects.
Recent widespread adoption of intensive livestock production
techniques highlights the paradoxes and failures of the current
approach, and illustrates the model. Concentrated Animal Feed-
ing Operations (CAFOs) employ close confinement of large num-
bers of animals, net import of the large quantities of feeds
required, and cheap waste management techniques, relying
largely on land disposal of wastes and animal mortalities. 14 The
general permits for these operations have typically been so-called
"non-discharge" permits,' 5 which is consistent with our model.
However, the reality is that various discharges are now well docu-
mented, including air pollution by noxious odors and ammonia,
water pollution by spills, flooding and runoff, and groundwater
pollution by nitrogen and phosphorus.1 6 Thus, neighboring
13. George Carlin, Brain Droppings, page 36 Hyperion, "Stuff" New York, 1997.
14. Michael A. Mallin, Impacts of Industrial Animal Production on Rivers and
Estuaries, 88 Am. Sci. 2, 2-13 (2000); Lawrence B. Cahoon et al., Nitrogen and Phos-
phorus Imports to the Cape Fear and Neuse River Basins to Support Intensive Live-
stock Production, 33 ENvTL. Sci. TECH. 410, 410-415 (1999); Carcass Disposal
Symposium, at ftp://ftp.ncagrgis.com/ (username = disposal, password = 2004disposal)
(last visited Nov. 10, 2004); D.W. Murphy et al., Purdue University Cooperative Ex-
tension, Disposal of Dead Swine, Pork Industry Handbook Fact Sheet No. 133 (1996).
15. EPA now requires individual NPDES permits of larger CAFOS, but is not au-
thorizing point source discharges.
16. See supra note 12; Steve Wing et al., The Potential Impact of Flooding on Con-
fined Animal Feeding Operations in Eastern North Carolina, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 387 (2002); Viney P. Aneja et al., Agricultural Ammonia Emissions and Am-
monium Concentrations Associated with Aerosols and Precipitation in the Southeast
United States, 108 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 4152 (2003); see National Atmospheric Depo-
sition Program, Animated Isopleth Maps, at http://nadp.sws.uiuc.edu/amaps/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2004); William J. Showers et al., Nitrogen Isotope Tracing of
Eutrophication Sources on a Watershed Scale: Neuse River Basin, North Carolina, in
NORTH CAROLINA WATER RESOURCES: THE YEAR OF THE HURRICANES 42 (2000); Sacoby
M. Wilson et al., Environmental Injustice and the Mississippi Hog Industry, 110
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 195 (2002); Dana Cole et al., Concentrated Swine Feeding Op-
erations and Public Health: A Review of Occupational and Community Health Effects,
108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERsp. 685 (2000); Steve Wing & Susanne Wolf, Intensive Live-
2005]
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properties have become unwilling and sometimes unknowing re-
ceptors of pollutants conducted by various media, generated by a
politically powerful agricultural industry protected from many en-
vironmental rules and regulations, and often resistant even to ba-
sic external monitoring, particularly of human health effects. 17
We recognize that the legislatures and executive branches of
government are unlikely to adopt protections for receptors be-
cause it is far less expensive for producers to contribute to electo-
ral campaigns than to contain all wastes and effluents.' 8
However, because we advocate a return to historic property rights
of receptors tweaked to reflect modern scientific realities, we
think the highest court of any state could adopt this principle
since the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held these issues are
a matter of state law.19 Courts are almost there, but they con-
tinue to favor generators without any scientific basis. We also of-
fer several concrete steps that could be taken in the time
necessary to implement the concept.
THE DATA DEFICIT
The bottom line is that there is a "Data Deficit" so vast that
the bases for the regulatory system must be questioned. The lack
of data provides a clever dodge for those who do not want the full
effects of their activities to be known. The lack of harm demon-
strated by epidemiological studies is used to imply a positive as-
sertion: that substances are safe, which is one reason why only
stock Operations, Health, and Quality of Life among Eastern North Carolina Re-
sidents, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 233 (2000).
17. Initially, the industry succeeded in convincing the North Carolina General
Assembly to eliminate (1) private nuisance actions based on farm activities, and (2)
the authority of local government to zone agricultural uses. See Pat Stith & Joby
Warrick, Boss Hog, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 19-26, 1995, available at http://
www.pulitzer.org/year/1996/public-service/works/about.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2004) (Pulitzer-prize winning series on hog farm pollution, corporate farming, and
politics).
18. For example, Bill Moyers reported in his PBS program, Trade Secrets, "'Gen-
tlemen, this is a campaign that has the dimension and detail of a war,' wrote one
committee chairman of the Chemical Manufacturer's Association (now called the
American Chemistry Council) in a 1979 report to the CMA board of directors. The
report lays out plans 'to moderate, change or stop governmental regulations in the
pollution control arena,' and urges more corporate financial support to fund "an effec-
tive army" that would include lobbyists, lawyers and public relations specialists. "The
dollars expended on offense," the committee chairman wrote, "are token compared to
future costs."' Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report (PBS Television Broadcast, 2001).
19. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
[Vol. 22
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sixty known carcinogens have been identified. 20 Thus the human
population and environment are used as test subjects until harms
are uncovered. It was an accidental epidemiological study that led
to the evidence of the harms of fine particulates in air, for exam-
ple.21 Some ninety percent of new chemical substances enter the
marketplace without rigorous health-based testing. Basic toxicity
data are not publicly available for some seventy-five percent of the
top volume chemicals produced in the United States.22 Interest-
ingly, commentators contend correctly that industry may actually
be over-regulated because of the lack of data, but how can one
know?
All questions of comparative risk are plagued by the inadequacy
of information about the nature and severity of environmental
problems. There is not enough toxicity data on most chemical[s]
to know whether they cause adverse effects. There are not
enough monitoring data to know to which pollutants people are
exposed. We do not understand many fundamental aspects of
the earth's ecology... Knowledge about how pollutants travel
from one part of the environment to another is woefully inade-
20. A. Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic
Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 269-362 (1992).
21. Fine particulate matter regulations which resulted only after a nearly-acci-
dental epidemiological study revealed that, though previously thought relatively be-
nign, they were harmful, particularly to children. See John J. Fialka, Provo, Utah,
Provides Combatants in Clean Air Fight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1996, at A20. (describ-
ing the process which led to the regulations which were the subject of the decision in
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)). Approximately 70 percent of
the cancer risk from air pollution in the state comes from diesel-particle pollution,
according to recent California studies. Natural Resources Defense Council, No
Breathing in the Aisles Diesel Exhaust Inside School Buses (Feb. 2001), at http://www.
nrdc.org/air/transportation/schoolbus/sbusinx.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (citing
South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Multiple Air Toxics Exposure Study in the South
Coast Air Basin (MATES-II), at ES-2 (Mar. 2000); Cal. Air Res. Bd., Risk Reduction
Plan to Reduce Particulate Matter Emissions From Diesel-Fueled Engines and Vehi-
cles at 15 (Sept. 2000)). See also, EPA, Office of Water, How Safe is it to Swim in
Santa Monica Bay? Epidemiology Study Assess Health Risks, at http://www.epa.gov/
owow/estuaries/coastlines/96summer.pdf (1996); See, e.g., Am. Lung Ass'n, Factsheet
on Secondhand Smoke, at http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=DVLUK900E&b=
35422 (Nov. 2004).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (setting
forth the requirements for testing of chemical substances and mixtures under the
Act). Some ninety percent of new chemical substances enter the marketplace without
rigorous health-based testing, and there are not even basic toxicity data publicly
available for some seventy-five percent of the top volume chemicals produced in the
United States. John Murphy, Risky Business, AMicus J., Spring 1998, at 23, 23-25.
See generally THEO COLBORN, ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE (1996).
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quate. These are problems both of fundamental scientific knowl-
edge and of inadequate data collection.2 3
EPA has even developed a program entitled, "The P2 (Pollu-
tion Prevention) Framework," designed to screen the 2000 new ap-
plications for potentially toxic chemicals submitted each year
based on computer models, i.e., without empirical data since it
lacks the legal authority to require testing data unless EPA has
already made a determination of unreasonable risk at EPA's ex-
pense.24 That is not likely given that according to the Sierra
Club's latest tally, the present administration has cut $492 mil-
lion from the EPA budget and the Bush Administration has pro-
posed a five per cent (5%) cut overall for 2005-2006.25 Because of
public interest and liability issues, the American Chemistry Asso-
ciation (formerly the Chemical Manufacturers Association) and
Environmental Defense have begun to analyze High-Production
Volume (HPV) Chemicals. 26 Critics point out that manufacturers
of some 25% of HPV chemicals have not provided information,
however, and that the voluntary cooperation from the industry
was calculated to deflect calls for greater regulatory scrutiny.2 7
23. J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE U.S.
SYSTEM WORK? 27-29 (RFF Press 1997).
24. Before manufacture for commercial purposes, industry must submit a PMN to
EPA, and EPA, OPPT has 90 days to identify chemicals posing risk(s) and regulate
when needed. There is no requirement under TSCA that the submitter conduct test-
ing on new chemicals, however if tests are conducted, this data must be submitted
with the PMN. Less than 10% of PMNs submitted have publicly available data such
as an LD50. An alarmingly small number of PMNs have enough publicly available
data to perform a rudimentary assessment of risk. Uncertain Risks Industry submits
2,000 PMNs annually. In many cases, when alternative chemicals or processes are
considered at R&D, commercialization decisions are based on factors such as efficacy,
yield, performance, and cost. While EPA sees 2,000 PMNs per year, industry has
made thousands of other decisions early in R&D, long before PMN submission. By
the time EPA sees the PMN, most of the P2 opportunities have been lost. Industry
has needed to make decisions without understanding risk tradeoffs of product/process
alternatives. EPA, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, Pollution Prevention
(P2) Framework, available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/p2framework/images/p2man
0103001020intromodelsepi.pdf (last edited Jan. 2004).
25. Sierra Club, By the Numbers, SIERRA MAG., Sept./Oct. 2004, available at http:/
/www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200409/lol.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
26. Environmental Defense, Chemical Testing and Assessment, at http://www.
environmentaldefense.org/systemltemplates/pagesubissue.cfm?subissue=14 (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2004).
27. See Environmental Defense, Orphan Chemicals in the HPV Challenge, A Sta-
tus Report, (June 17, 2004), at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/pdf.cfm?Content
ID=3810&FileName=HPVorphansReport_062004.pdf&CFID=9299386&CFTOKEN=
28953686 (last visited Nov. 10, 2004); Trade Secrets: A Moyers Report (PBS television
broadcast, 2001).
[Vol. 22
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The Center for Disease Control recently implemented The Na-
tional Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals,
"an ongoing assessment of the U.S. population's exposure to envi-
ronmental chemicals using biomonitoring,"28 i.e., using the citi-
zenry as test subjects. Unfortunately, on April 8, 2005, EPA's
acting administrator cancelled one effort to quantify exposure to
pesticides and household chemicals (the Children's Health Envi-
ronmental Exposure Research Study) because the design was so
flawed 29 . Critics charged that the study had ethical problems and
design flaws 30 , including intentionally allowing children's expo-
sure to contaminants known to be harmful to them, funding by the
chemical industry and its focus on low-income families of color.
While these flaws must be addressed by applying sound science,
the results will clearly be substantially delayed.
The list of issues missed because of the dearth of scientific
analysis reads like a "who's who" of the history of the environ-
ment: lead, mercury, asbestos, Agent Orange, PCB's, PVC, dioxin,
all but a handful of hazardous air pollutants (until the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990) and most of indoor air pollution, for
starters. 31 Also missed were common economic activities: under-
ground storage tanks were buried and surprise expressed when
the often-hazardous contents leaked; aerial spraying was not be-
lieved to affect surface water until the Ninth Circuit reminded us
that the process is not so precise as to remain within property
boundaries.32 Recently, the State of North Carolina finally con-
ceded after many years that the evaporation from intensive live-
stock lagoons and from industrial settling ponds included
pollutants such as H2S, 33 and EPA has acted on overwhelming evi-
dence that mercury in the surface waters of the nation had been
28. Center for Disease Control, National Report on Human Exposure to Environ-
mental Chemicals, at http://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/ (last reviewed May 12,
2004). Also, K. Sexton, L.L. Needham, and J.L. Pirkle, (2004), Human Biomonitoring
of Environmental Chemicals, 92 American Scientist, pp. 38-45.
29. See http://www.epa.gov/cheers/.
30. See http://www.pested.org/programs/cheers.html#moreinfo.
31. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
32. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
33. Wade Rawlins, Mill's Stench Might be Toxic, newsobserver.com, at http:/!
www.news-observer.com/news/story/1719104p-7979814c.html (Oct. 10, 2004).
2005]
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airborne (mostly from fossil-fueled power plants), contrary to what
air quality agencies maintained even a few years ago.34
Since Congress has been unwilling to fund this research, we
propose a property rights analysis and remedy that would compel
generators to provide the data before any discharge leaves prop-
erty boundaries.
MARKET ECONOMICS DEMANDS THAT
EXTERNALITIES BE ELIMINATED
Another major problem is that environmental law is not now
designed to attain the pivotal goal noted by both the President's
Science Advisory Committee (1965) and President Nixon's first
Council on Environmental Quality (1970): to eliminate environ-
mental "externalities".35 What are externalities and how do they
affect US? 36
34. 40 CFR Parts 60, 63, 72, and 75,[OAR-2002-0056; FRL-] RIN 2060-AJ65
(March 15, 2005); see also discussion by EPA at: http://www.epa.gov/mercuryrule/
rule.htm (last visited April 22, 2005).
35. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PANEL, PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE, RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 1-2, 5-7, 10-15 (1965); COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 5-18 (1970).
36. Health care effects, for example, are often dramatic. The President's Science
Advisory Committee in 1965 wrote that, "Today we are certain that pollution ad-
versely affects the quality of our lives. In the future, it may affect their duration."
One of the latest: mercury, found in air emissions from fossil-fueled power plants.
"Mercury can interfere with brain development of fetuses and children, although any-
one who consumes large amounts of fish is also susceptible to health problems related
to this neurotoxin. Because one in 12 women of childbearing age in the United States
are estimated to have unsafe levels of mercury in their blood, more than 600,000
newborns each year are put at risk of brain damage and learning disabilities." Envi-
ronmental Defense, Mercury Pollution Endangers Public Health, at http://www.
environmentaldefense.org/system/templates/page/subissue.cfm?subissue=20 (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2004). Forty states now have partial or statewide consumption advisories
for fish consumption, but these are voluntary measures with no enforcement provi-
sions against sources of this poison. EPA, Fish Advisories, at http://www.epa.gov/ostl
fish (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). With respect to diesel exhaust, "EPA has estimated
that by 2030, the highway diesel rule will avoid 8,300 premature deaths per year,
which otherwise would have been caused by exposure to particulate pollution from
diesel emissions (see Table VII-19). The rule is also projected to prevent more than
7,000 hospital admissions, 360,000 asthma attacks and more than 1.5 million lost
work days in 2030 (see Table VII-19). The non-road rule similarly promises tremen-
dous health benefits in 2030,including the avoidance of 12,000 premature deaths and
8,900 hospital admissions per year from particulate pollution exposure (see Table 9-
11). The non-road rule is also projected to avoid 200,000 cases of exacerbated asthma
in children in 2030 (see Table 9)." Jana Milford et al., Speeding the Transition to
Cleaner Diesel Engines to Help Americans Breathe Easier Today (June 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/3799_DieselWhitePaper0604.
pdf. Power generation is also estimated to have additional dramatic effects: air pollu-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss1/3
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Our price system fails to take into account the environmental
damage that the polluter inflicts on others. Economists call
these damages.. . 'external social costs' [externalities]. They re-
flect the ability of one entity, e.g., a company, to use water or air
as a free resource for waste disposal, while others pay the cost in
contaminated air or water. If there were a way to make the
price structure shoulder these external costs-taxing the firm
for the amount of discharge, for instance-then the price for the
goods and services produced would reflect those costs. Failing
this, goods whose production spawns pollution are greatly under
priced because the purchaser does not pay for pollution abate-
ment that would prevent environmental damage. Not only does
this failure encourage pollution but it warps the price structure.
A price structure that took environmental degradation into ac-
count would cause a shift in prices, hence a shift in consumer
preference and, to some extent, would discourage buying pollu-
tion-producing products. 37
tion from power plants is blamed for some 24,000 deaths and 38,000 non-fatal heart
attacks each year. National Campaign Against Dirty Power, Get the Facts and Clear
the Air, at http://cta.policy.net/dirtypower/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). See also Trade
Secrets: A Moyers Report (PBS television broadcast, 2001). Air pollution studies have
also indicated permanent lung damage in children from existing air pollution levels.
California Air Resources Board, (2004) ttp://www.arb.ca.gov/researchlabstracts/94-
331.htm, and a Columbia University Study indicated that "prenatal exposure to ur-
ban air pollutants can cause genetic alterations in babies in utero" http://www.ccceh.
org / news-events I ChromMutationsReleaseFinalEmb-2-15.htm.
Pollution cleanup costs are enormous ("The economic costs of pollution are mas-
sive-billions of dollars annually.. .Direct costs to city dwellers can be measured in
additional household maintenance, cleaning and medical bills... The farmer's crop
yield is reduced or destroyed."). COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
iTY 5-18 (1970). For example, Superfund, federal EPA cleanup of the worst of the
worst sites (some 1200 on the National Priorities list) was estimated by the CATO
institute in 1995 to cost some $6 billion per year and is estimated to cost $14-16.4
billion (2000-2009) in the future. KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., SUPERFUND'S FUTURE
WHAT WILL IT COST? (2001).
Loss of business (e.g., the Santa Barbara oil spill), diminished property value and
lost tax revenue (Love Canal, Times Beach), loss of use of property and loss of prop-
erty value from pollution or proximity to pollution, crop damage (timber and straw-
berry losses from air pollution) are some common examples. Loss of recreation as well
as food sources are exemplified by the recent warnings on mercury (airborne and soil)
in inland fisheries as well as tuna. Externalities from the automobile (congestion, air
pollution and safety) are estimated to be $100 billion per year. David Gerard & Les-
ter Lave, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, CAFE Increases: Miss-
ing the Elephant in the Living Room (June 2004), available at http://aei-brookings.org/
admin/authorpdfspage.php?id=1003 (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
Also, see D.O. Ofiara and J.J. Seneca (2001), Economic Losses from Marine Pollu-
tion, Island Press, Washington, D.C.
37. The Council on Environmental Quality, The State of the Environment (1970).
11
66 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Dean James Huffman of the Lewis and Clark Law School writes:
The efficiency theory assumes that market participants bear the
full costs of their activities. When those costs are "externalized"
to third parties, there is a market failure in the sense that one of
the assumed conditions of an efficient market is missing. In
such cases, regulations may be designed to internalize the full
cost to the decision maker [generator]. 38
The benefits of environmental strategies, such as improved
health and productivity and reduced healthcare costs, preserva-
tion and enhancement of property values and even production effi-
ciency, are well known, although generators' complaints of the
cost of environmental compliance receive widespread attention.39
The report of the Nixon Administration's Council of Environmen-
tal Quality, prepared by the nation's top accounting firms in 1972,
even found in a comprehensive sector-by-sector analysis that the
economic effects of pollution control would be positive. 40
Why do generators complain about internalization? As Rose
explains, "Landowners [generators] are accustomed to regarding
their land as their property, but they simultaneously regard the
adjacent air, water and wildlife as goods that are free for the tak-
ing."4 1 Curious, since it is clearly other owners' rights they are
invading-public or private. In many if not most cases, of course,
the receptors may not even know about the pollution or its effects
for years, nor do they have any stake in it. Pollutants ". . .can be
carried long distances by air or water or on articles of commerce,
threatening the health, longevity, livelihood, recreation, cleanli-
38. James L. Huffman, Environmental Protection and the Politics of Property
Rights: The Public Interest in Private Property Rights, 50 OKI-A. L. REV. 377, 380
n.11, 383-84 (1997); see also William Simmons & Robert H. Cutting, Jr., A Many-
Layered Wonder: Non-Vehicular Air Pollution Control in California, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
109, 113 (1975); J.H. DALEs, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 7-8 (1968); ERIK T.
VERHOEF, HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL. AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 197-214 (1999).
39. See EPA, National Center for Environmental Economics, at http://yosemite.
epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/homepage (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
40. Council on Environmental Quality, The Economic Costs of Pollution Control
(1972).
41. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trade and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 137 (1998). "Historically, man
has assumed that the land, water and air.. .would absorb his waste products." CoUN-
CIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 5-18 (1970). We like Prof. Rose's
analogy to cyberspace and compare trespassing pollutants to adware and spyware
invading your computer!
[Vol. 22
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss1/3
2005] THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX 67
ness and happiness of citizens who have no direct stake in their
production but cannot escape their influence."42
The Data Deficit makes quantification difficult, of course.
Then, too, the value of quietude or the price of a sunset in the
Sierra Nevada unobstructed by polluting haze are not easily
translated to dollars. Although environmental economists are
working to quantify these effects, "[MIost environmental ameni-
ties cannot [presently] be adequately monetized, not because they
are not valuable, but because they are not supplied through a
market."43
Some, like UCLA's James Krier, argue that the formula to
achieve greatest economic efficiency ought to be "Cost to Receptors
plus Cost to Reduce Externalities." While this may lead to eco-
nomic efficiency on one level, that is not the only social goal of
environmental policy and it ignores issues of equity, that is, "who
pays?"44 By definition, the cost to reduce the externalities is sup-
posed to be internalized and passed on to customers.
42. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PANEL, PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE, RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 1-2, 5-7, 10-15 (1965).
43. Environmental economics has long been overlooked, for somewhat obvious
reasons and is imprecise itself. Property values can assist, but are not precise given
reliance on the "comparable sales" formulae. Pollution will sometimes have both
short- and long-term direct health effects on third parties, and will often have indirect
effects for wildlife and ecosystems. In these circumstances in the recent past, the leg-
islatures created regulatory "referees" to internalize the direct and indirect costs.
David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection
of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 335-36 (1988).
44. James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- And
Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. R. 323 (1974); see also, MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF
THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988) (contends efficiency is
not the only model to follow given that our behavior as consumers does not always
coincide with our beliefs as citizens). A legion of writers advocate more attention to
the Economy of Nature rather than our Transformative Economy: Joseph L. Sax,
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1993) [hereinafter Sax, Economy of
Nature]; see also, Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1971) (discussing the view of the interconnectedness between
property owners and property rights); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733, 771 (1964); David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call
for Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources,
12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 313-17 (1988); J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST.
COMMENT. 239, 244-45 (1990).
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A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS INTERNALIZES
WITHOUT THE POLITICAL SHENANIGANS AND
WOULD ALSO REQUIRE BETTER DATA
Our analytical model is straightforward and offers an objec-
tive test based on the existing system of property lines. If pollu-
tion, including phenomena such as heat, light, odor, and radiation,
transgresses the boundaries of the generator or producer property
(real or personal), it by definition enters the space of other prop-
erty, whether public or private. We argue that anything that is
added to transitory resources such as the air masses or water-
courses (surface or ground) or which enters the space of another
owner is also a trespass.
Once the nature of the release is understood, the burden must
be on the generator/producer to quantify all externalities, which
can only be accomplished with a great deal more scientific analy-
sis than present government budgets permit, and to eliminate any
invasion or demonstrate the consent of the receptor. The immedi-
ate advantage is that quite literally both the wastes and the costs
to the generator are internalized to space owned or controlled by
the generator-subject also to onsite regulations such as the
rights of workers and visitors.
There are several sound legal bases for the concept. What we
are really recommending, of course, is not the result of an individ-
ual case, although it may require such a case to re-establish the
property rights of receptors. Instead, we suggest a new (old) way
of looking at property issues from the ecosystemic viewpoint.
THE VENERATED RULES OF TRESPASS:
Historically, the law treated any physical incursion into prop-
erty not owned by the generator/producer as a trespass, which the
courts would: (1) terminate, and (2) require the trespasser to pay
at least nominal damages even where there was no actual dam-
age. The theory was simply that the legal interest known as prop-
erty must be vigorously protected or the concept of private
property would be valueless.45 John Locke himself, the patron
saint of the "Property Rights" movement, recognized that the
value of property is dependent on the political and legal system
45. For an excellent review of the evolution of trespass and nuisance, See H. Mar-
low Green, Note, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A Comparative
Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and England and a Model
for the Future, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 541, 552 (1997).
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that creates and protects it.46 A classic law school example in-
volves an object, tossed by X from Property A, through the air-
space of Property B, which falls to earth on Property C (B and C
are not owned or possessed lawfully by X). There has been a tres-
pass to the airspace of Property B, and to both airspace and land
of Property C. Regardless of actual harm, damages would be
awarded as a deterrent to protect the legal estate we know as
property. The Oregon Supreme Court in Martin v. Reynolds Alu-
minum expressed the core of the rights of receptor owners this
way:
Probably the most important factor which describes the nature
of the interest protected under the law of trespass is nothing
more than a feeling which a possessor has with respect to land
which he holds. It is a sense of ownership; a feeling that what
one owns or possesses should not be interfered with, and that it
is entitled to protection through law. This being the nature of
the plaintiffs interest, it is understandable why actual damage
is not an essential ingredient in the law of trespass.47 [emphasis
added]
The tort of trespass was based on strict liability without even a de
minimis defense.48 The concept proved troublesome during the
Industrial Revolution when the air, water and soil were viewed as
"free goods" for the taking as waste disposal media. 49 Courts thus
altered the law of trespass radically when the material (water-
borne or airborne) was "invisible," concluding without scientific
basis that there was no physical invasion. This resulted in a
lower-tier category of "indirect trespass", (the so-called, "dimen-
sional test"), which these courts then measured by the much more
subjective rules of nuisance. Unlike the clear and objective bound-
ary test of trespass, the concept of "nuisance" allows judges to
deny relief unless the invasion caused "unreasonable interference"
with the receptor property, providing judges multiple opportuni-
ties subjectively to "balance" the interests of the generator and the
46. "[It would be a direct contradiction for any one to enter into society with
others for the securing and regulating of property, and yet to suppose his land ...
should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government to which he himself, and
the property of the land, is a subject." John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nui-
sance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6 n.25 (1993) (quoting 2 John
Locke, Two Treatises of Government § 3, 124 (Everyman's Library 1991) (1690)).
47. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 796-797 (Or. 1959).
48. 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 109-115, 111 (1990).
49. COUiNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 5-18 (1970).
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receptors. 50 "Industrial progress" was routinely found to outweigh
what the courts called, "trifling inconveniences" to receptors
(water pollution and air pollution), whose rights had in the past
received absolute protection from the courts. 51 Even when a nui-
sance was found to exist, courts created an escape from liability if
control were not technologically feasible. 52
But by the late Twentieth Century, at least some U.S. courts
began to recognize that in the atomic era, it could not be denied
that even materials invisible to the naked eye physically enter the
"space" of other property once they exit the generators' bounda-
ries. Courts have even suggested that there may be no nuisance
that is not also a trespass by some material or disturbance (e.g.
odor or sound waves).53 When confronted with the conclusion that
the distinction between direct and indirect trespasses had no sci-
entific basis and ought to be discarded, the courts recognized that
a return to historic notions of trespass would eliminate all trans-
boundary pollution. As the Alabama Supreme Court noted in Bor-
land, "It might appear, at first blush, from our holding today that
every property owner in this State would have a cause of action
against any neighboring industry which emitted particulate mat-
ter into the atmosphere, or even a passing motorist, whose ex-
haust emissions come to rest upon another's property."54
That would be the end of this article, but the courts punted
and in another case of radical judicial activism created an excep-
tion to venerated law. On policy alone, without any scientific in-
quiry, evidence or basis, the courts created another inferior
category of trespass for pollutants. If the trespass is visible, no
damage at all is required under historic rules. But if invisible pol-
lutants are involved, these courts have added a requirement that
there must be substantial damage to the property itself or persons
50. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 524, 527-528 (1982).
51. De Blois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621, 623 (D. Mass. 1930); Pa. Coal Co. v. Sander-
son, 6 A. 453, 459 (Pa. 1886).
52. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1970).
53. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d at 794-96 (smelting and vibrations
from blasting); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 790 (Wash. 1985);
Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d at 530 (Ala. 1979). Curiously, other courts
still engage in the fiction that invisible particles such as smoke, odors, dust or ashes
did not "touch" the receptor's "land" although they clearly invaded the legal interest
known as "property" and following the laws of nature, some of the particles must have
"touched" or even landed on the surface. Long v. City of Charlotte, 293 S.E.2d 101
(N.C. 1982) (citing earlier decisions).
54. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d at 530 (Ala. 1979).
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on the property- even damage to property value was not enough to
permit an action.55 These courts have either simply confused the
issue of damages with the elements of the cause of action, or they
have created an additional element to the cause of action which
has no basis in the history of property or trespass. If the cause of
action exists, the diminution of property value, including in many
jurisdictions the "stigma" which attaches to once-polluted prop-
erty even after remediation, is an element of damages, not a de-
fense. If the property has no value, the measure is the cost to
cure.5 6 Green suggests that use of the substantial injury test is an
acceptable component of the inquiry since it is viewed "[from] the
vantage point of the plaintiff."57 We are not convinced that courts
view the requirement thusly, nor do we think courts ought to be
given the discretion to inquire. Either the material is in the
"space" known as the property or it is not. If it is, in any form or
quantity, the generator ought to be held accountable and an in-
junction should issue58 . Why allow a property invasion when the
harm might only be apparent to future generations (e.g., DES), or
after many years of "belief' that the material is not harmful be-
55. See, e.g., Ramik v. Darling Int'l, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 772, 778 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (noting that harm in the form of decreased property value is not irreparable
because it can be compensated with monetary relief).
56. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 111 (1990); 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 118 (1990); Bradley v.
Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 785-86 (Wash. 1985); Carolina Power & Light
v. Paul, 136 S.E.2d 103 (N.C. 1964) (damages temporary, but the property value could
not be restored to pre-injury status). On the subject of "stigma," courts often distin-
guish between properties physically affected as opposed to those where there is no
physical invasion, but the property lies nearby a source of pollution (so-called "pure
stigma" cases). See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) for
the former. The split in jurisdictions on pure stigma is illustrated by DeSario v. In-
dus. Excess Landfill, 587 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991), overruled in part by, Rami-
rez v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, 791 N.E.2d 1031 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), where landowners
claimed stigma damages from proximity to a Superfund landfill, versus Twitty v.
State, 354 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), where location near a PCB landfill, with-
out invasion or interference with plaintiffs property, is not actionable.
57. H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A
Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and England
and a Model for the Future, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 541, 584 (1997).
58. One federal court attempting to interpret North Carolina law even went so far
as to declare that if the pollution which formed the basis of the trespass did not exceed
state standards-in that case the groundwater standards-a trespass could not be
actionable, although even seasoned defense counsel have questioned the logic of the
court Grant v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 4:91-CV-55-H (E.D.N.C. July 14, 1995),
affd sub nom. Stancill v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 91 F. 3d 133 (4th Cir. 1996),
criticized soundly at a recent CLE held by the NC Bar Association, Litigating Toxic
Torts and Environmental Claims - Not Just a Walk in the Park (Oct. 1, 2004); contra
Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 7-95-CV-187 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
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cause of the Data Deficit (such as mercury, lead, asbestos, PVC,
dioxin or fine particulates)?
Why property is entitled to absolute protection against visible
invasions from a Frisbee, but odorless, colorless toxic pollutants
are given free passage unless the receptor property owner (at its
expense) can prove some "damage" beyond the loss of property
value is difficult to comprehend. The courts were simply unwill-
ing to halt pollution and this desired result dictated a rule without
any scientific rationale at all. The Alabama Supreme Court can-
didly admitted that it simply sought to stem a floodtide of lawsuits
to prevent pollution-ironic indeed since the right existed until
the courts excised it in favor of the Industrial Revolution, "[w]hile
at common law any trespass entitled a landowner to recover nomi-
nal or punitive damages... [n]o useful purpose would be served
by sanctioning actions in trespass by every landowner within a
hundred miles of a manufacturing plant. Manufacturers would be
harassed and the litigious few would cause the escalation of costs
to the detriment of many."59
No useful purposes would be served except: (1) Sound science
that is presently lacking would be required to gauge the effects of
the trespass, (2) Internalization of offsite waste disposal costs
would occur as the market economy demands (which is supposed
to result in increased costs until generators become more effi-
cient), and (3) protection of all other property owners (usually far
more numerous than generators) would occur! One might expect
that establishment of any new (in this case, renewed) right might
result in more litigation until defendants realized the import of
the rule, but that is the nature of the behavior modification
process.
The Alabama court created a new defense of "de minimis,"
simply by asserting that there was a point (not grounded in sci-
ence) where the trespass is "so lacking in substance" that the
courts would refuse to recognize it6 ° . But even a minor trespass
historically resulted in an injunction and damages to preserve the
rights of the receptor property. The Washington court imposed a
balancing defense based on "technological or economic justifica-
tions for trespassory invasions" in place of the strict liability for
59. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791.
60. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979). In Borland, the
plaintiffs sued a battery recycling facility for damages resulting from emissions of
lead particulates and sulfur dioxide gases into the air and onto plaintiffs' property.
See id.
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trespass which had always existed, citing only the, "historically
harsh treatment of conduct interfering with another's possessory
interests."61 What is so harsh about preventing invasion of recep-
tors' space by generators, especially when the results may not be
known for decades and the methodology to achieve redress so un-
certain in result and expensive in transactional costs?
The Oregon Supreme Court rationalized its position by opin-
ing that since folks are generally more law-abiding nowadays (a
questionable premise), there was little chance that the trespasses
would result in breaches of the peace. 62 One might question both
the veracity and the logic of the conclusion. 63
In fact, these courts all employed result-oriented reasoning to
avoid short-term consequences to the generator at the expense of
the short- and long-term effects on all receptors. Each court was
more willing radically to alter common law based on flawed sci-
ence than it was: (1) to force the internalization of costs passed on
to others via offsite disposal of waste, and (2) to protect the his-
toric and investment-backed expectations of receptors. The law,
like natural organisms, can correct growth in the wrong direction,
and in this case it can be done by the highest court of any state
because property law, including trespass and nuisance, is pecu-
liarly a matter of state law.64
If some interim protection were required to transition away
from free waste disposal, the courts could supervise implementa-
tion over time. Moreover, a defense already exists at common law
if the courts saw a need for extraordinary relief from true trespass
in cases of real hardship. A common law school example of neces-
sity is the boater who is on a lake when a sudden thunderstorm
arises and who moors to a pier owned by another. A limited tres-
pass to permit one to reach safety is protected by the defense. 65 A
61. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 787.
62. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 796 (Or. 1959).
63. The Martin court also held that even a seemingly de minimis trespass would
still constitute a trespass if"an act on the part of the defendant in interfering with the
plaintiffs possession, does, or is likely to result in arousing conflict between them."
Martin, 342 P.2d at 796. An opportunistic plaintiff might even instigate conflict as a
means to trigger the tort, however; hardly the intended result.
64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992); Stevens v. City
of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 450-51 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 318 (N.Y.
1997); see also John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings
Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993).
65. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 35 (1990).
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limited right to pollute under certain circumstances might be
excused.
If a cause of action utilizing historic principles were re-estab-
lished, the usual remedies include (nominal) damages and the
possibility of punitive damages. There is also authority for the is-
suance of injunctive relief to prevent future trespasses. While it is
true that damages may lie, true protection of the legal estate
would argue for preventative relief.6 6 Moreover, the trespass
could form the basis for additional claims for (1) nuisance, espe-
cially in those jurisdictions where the courts recognize that there
is seldom a nuisance that does not involve a trespass of some
type,67 and (2) unfair business practices, such as California Busi-
ness & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq., since the pollution
is usually related to a business that is attempting to gain competi-
tive advantage by passing waste disposal costs on to others.68
These theories provide the basis for an injunction to prevent the
trespass at the source. What point is there in requiring a multi-
plicity of litigation for trespass any more than for other nuisances
and unfair business practices? Nuisances and unfair business
practices are abated at the source and the trespass should thus be
eliminated by those in control of defendant, at a minimum at the
property boundary of the generator.
The Washington Supreme Court in Bradley noted in dicta
that absent substantial injury courts might be reluctant to exer-
cise equitable jurisdiction to require expensive control measures.
Why wait to prove injury any greater than invasion of a legal in-
terest that also may constitute a taking of constitutional dimen-
sions (see discussion, infra). Why permit externalization of the
waste disposal costs of the generator, when market economics de-
mands otherwise and the real harm may not be known for years?
The burden ought to be on those who propose to trespass to
demonstrate with substantial scientific evidence the true nature
66. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 789.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-209 (West 2001) (providing injunc-
tive relief when a court finds unfair trade practices); 75 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 16 (1999);
see also James Wheaton, California's Unfair Competition Law: The Biggest Hammer
in the Tool Box, 9 ENVTL. L. NEws (California State Bar), Summer 2000, available at
http://www.calbar.org/enviro/news/v09n2/hammer.htm. (Mr. Cutting filed dozens of
actions under this section as deputy in charge of the white collar crime unit of Santa
Barbara County, CA and chair of the California District Attorneys Ass'n Consumer
Protection Council (So. Sec.) for business practices ranging from environmental viola-
tions to auto repair schemes).
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of the proposed invasion, and to accept responsibility for any fu-
ture harms based on sound science. In fact, the courts prior to the
"modernization" of nuisance law recognized that denial of an in-
junction for future harms meant that the burden fell on the victim
rather than the perpetrator.
69
CURRENT POLICIES RESULT IN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS OF RECEPTORS'
PROPERTY RIGHTS
From another property rights perspective, courts have found
that when a nuisance is imposed on another property, it consti-
tutes a "taking" of the property rights of the receptor. If the inva-
sion is enabled by government in some way, by issuing a permit or
restricting the rights of receptors to sue, it is a taking without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. In a recent landmark case, the Iowa Supreme Court
declared that a permit to allow an intensive livestock facility to
create an odor and health nuisance that affected adjoining farm
properties constituted imposition of an "easement" over the recep-
tors' properties, which unlawfully took their property rights with-
out compensation7 0 because the Iowa statute prevented receptors
from suing the permit holder based on nuisance (the "state
action"). 71
69. "Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the
defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not good reason for refusing an
injunction. Neither courts of equity nor law can be guided by such a rule, for if fol-
lowed to its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of his little property
by giving it to those already rich. It is always to be remembered in such cases that
'denying the injunction puts the hardship on the party in whose favor the legal right
exists, instead of on the wrongdoer.'" Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1
(1913), cited in, H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environ-
ment: A Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and
England and a Model for the Future, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 541, 555 (1997).
70. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W. 2d 309, 321-22 (Iowa 1998). Certio-
rari Denied February 22, 1999, Reported at: 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1509.
71. The Court drew from a line of cases beginning with Richards v. Wash. Termi-
nal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1913). In Richards, a railroad constructed a tunnel immedi-
ately adjacent to plaintiffs property. Congress had both prescribed the route, then
conveniently attempted to immunize itself from liability for claims from neighboring
properties. The Supreme Court held that Congress could not thus deprive other prop-
erty owners of their constitutional rights. Id. at 557. Loretto v. Manhattan Tele-
prompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982) (permanent installation of cable
wires constitutes a taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1946)
(low-flying airplanes constitute a nuisance); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339
(1910) (government flooding cutting off an easement requires compensation); Brew-
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. . .generation of offensive odors, gases, smoke .. .may consti-
tute a taking.
The commentator ascribes a name to the theory of these cases:
condemnation by nuisance. And the commentator has formu-
lated the theory this way:
"governmental activity by an entity having the power of emi-
nent domain, which activity constitutes a nuisance according to
the law of torts, is a taking of property for public use, even
though such activity may be authorized by legislation."
Whether you flood the farmer's fields so that they cannot be cul-
tivated, or pollute the bleacher's stream so that his fabrics are
stained, or fill one's dwelling with smells and noise so that it
cannot be occupied in comfort, you equally take away the
owner's property. In neither instance has the owner any less of
material things than he had before, but in each case the utility
of his property has been impaired by a direct invasion of the
bounds of his private dominion. This is the taking of his prop-
erty in a constitutional sense. 7 2
The current U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case,
although: (1) the concepts are fundamental to environmental law,
(2) nearly every state has a Right-to-Farm Act with similar provi-
sions and (3) this Court has otherwise expressed great interest in
protecting generators' property rights.73 The Iowa Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed Bormann and found that in addition to the
"Takings" issue, where the plaintiffs' use pre-dated that of the de-
fendant intensive livestock operation, the nuisance immunity
ster v. City of Forney, 223 S.W. 175, 178 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920) (odor from sewage
disposal plant constitutes a taking).
72. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 320 (citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. Angel, 7 A. 432,
433-34 (N.J. 1886)).
73. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992). See also Nollan
v. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (there must be an essential nexus between
the state interest and the permit condition); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
394-95 (1994) (a dedication of open space was invalidated because less restrictive al-
ternatives to the dedication of a fee was available, hence there was no reasonable
relationship between the required dedication and the projected impact of the project);
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 689 (1999) (a property developer
claimed violation of his due process and equal protection rights because of the Califor-
nia judicial procedure for litigating a Takings claim). Significantly, the Court refused
to hear an appeal from the Oregon Supreme Court in Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 450-51 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Property owners contended that a claimed "new"
interpretation of the Public Trust doctrine unconstitutionally deprived them of rights
they thought they had to build a seawall. Justice Scalia dissented, notwithstanding
that he had written in Lucas that property law was the province of state courts. Ste-
vens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 450-51 (Or. 1993).
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statute also violated the "Inalienable Rights" provisions of the
Iowa Constitution and the Right-to-Farm statute was therefore,
an unreasonable use of the police power74 .
If a state permits or protects the imposition of a nuisance on
receptor property, it follows that, since few nuisances are not also
trespasses (and in fact odor would constitute a trespass), and
many of the cited cases involved trespasses, imposition of a tres-
pass would also constitute a taking. Of course, if the government
creates or maintains the offensive activity, the action would sound
in inverse condemnation. 75
If the invasion is not accompanied by state action, it is an un-
lawful usurpation of the power to condemn property by the gener-
ator. On this point, the courts pay lip service to the property
rights of the receptors, but back away from historic protections.
Plaintiff Oscar Boomer and his neighbors had complained that the
dust, noise, and vibration from a Portland cement plant disturbed
their peace and health and diminished property values. The New
York Court of Appeals upheld the trial court finding that the
noise, dust, and vibration were clearly "unreasonable" and, there-
fore, a nuisance, but expressly refused to follow the longstanding
rule of New York courts that the nuisance must therefore be
abated. Instead, a majority of the court held that a court could
refuse an injunction if, (1) the economic cost to the defendant or
the community (i.e. jobs and tax base) outweighed the imposition
on the plaintiffs; and (2) a solution to the nuisance was not yet
technologically feasible. 76 The dissent vigorously disagreed:
74. Joseph Gacke et al v. Pork Extra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168; 2004 Iowa Sup
LEXIS 193 (2004). The Iowa legislature had re-drafted the statute at issue in
Bormann, but failed to persuade the court either of any substantive difference or that
Bormann should be overruled. See pp 173-174. On the other hand, the Court noted in
dicta that remedies other than damages to property value, the standard Iowa mea-
sure of damage for a "takings" claim such as attorneys fees and costs could be limited
(at 174-175). However, the court did require consideration of future damages where
the nuisance was likely to continue (at 184-185). Other states, such as California,
have attempted to limit injunctive relief for nuisance in areas zoned commercial or
industrial (Calfiornia Code of Civil Procedure Sec., 731a, for example), although Cali-
fornia courts have held that activities authorized by zoning cannot deprive a plaintiff
of the right to sue in nuisance because of the manner in which the activity is con-
ducted. Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 116, inter-
preting California Civil Code Section 3482.
75. Long v. City of Charlotte, 293 S.E.2d 101 (N.C. 1982) (Supreme Court of
North Carolina upholding inverse condemnation as basis for neighbors' suit for air-
port noise and vibration).
76. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting); Borland, 369 So. 2d at 526.
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A private person or corporation for private gain or advantage
may not invoke this kind of inverse condemnation. Inverse con-
demnation should only be permitted when the public is prima-
rily served in the taking or impairment of property. The
promotion of the interests of the polluting cement company has,
in my opinion, no public use or benefit... Nor is it constitution-
ally permissible to impose a servitude on land, without consent
of the owner, by payment of permanent damages where the con-
tinuing impairment of the land is for a private use. This is made
clear by the State Constitution Art. I Sec.7(a) which provides
that "private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation." It is of course, significant that the section
makes no mention of taking for a private use. In sum, then, by
constitutional mandate as well as by judicial pronouncement,
the permanent impairment of private property for private pur-
poses is not authorized in the absence of clearly demonstrated
public benefit and use.77
The Alabama Supreme Court also held that simply allowing
or requiring a private defendant effectively to buy out a plaintiff,
... would permit private condemnation, which, unquestionably, is
impermissible."7 s
Ironically, the defendant in another key case, Bradley v.
American Smelting & Refining Co. ,9 urged that it had acquired a
prescriptive easement over plaintiffs' property by polluting it for
some time, so that a nuisance action could never arise because the
defendant had acquired a property right to pollute. That claim
was soundly rejected by the court.
It seems to us more difficult to ignore a trespass, regardless of
technological feasibility. Moreover, from a policy standpoint, the
Boomer majority position also discourages technological evolution
by rewarding the polluter who claims inability to control
discharges.
PROTECTION OF THE "COMMONS"
Whether the receptor property is private or public should
make no difference. Nor should it matter whether the source is
stationary (as with real property), or personal property which is
77. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
78. Borland, 369 So. 2d at 526.
79. Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791-92.
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mobile (such as an automobile), since the focus is on release into
the property of others, rather than on the rights of the owners.80
Thus, this approach also incorporates protections for public
resources advanced by proponents of the "commons," which is em-
bodied in U.S. law in part through the "public trust" concept.8 ' In
the U.S., surface waters are held in the "public trust" for the use
and benefit of all (though adjacent owners have some privileges).
Although in other nations and eras dating back to Byzantine
times, the notion included air, that is not the case in the U.S.82
Public trust property cannot be transferred without compensa-
tion, yet it has regularly been subjected to pollution of every
sort. 3 Concepts of public trust property are also constantly evolv-
ing and are properly a matter of state law.8 4 The prohibition of
pollution of public waters also finds support in statutory law poli-
cies, notably the Clean Water Act's call for an end to discharges to
surface waters (by 1985!).85
THERE IS NO RIGHT TO POLLUTE:
In Driscoll v. Adams,8 6 for example, an applicant for an
NPDES permit to discharge waste to US surface waters chal-
lenged the agency refusal to issue a permit since the agency had
80. Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529; Bradley, 709 P.2d at 787, 791; Martin, 342 P.2d at
796.
81. BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY 33-
48 (1st ed. Random House 1971).
82. The public may pay dearly for bottled water, but it is difficult to imagine pub-
lic acceptance of personal portable air tanks as a substitute for healthful air.
83. For example, the teaching of Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine
County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), has not been extended beyond surface waters. For a
thorough discussion of the public trust concepts, see Harrison C. Dunning, The Public
Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 ENvTL. L. 515 (1989);
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 397, 437 (1892); Sax, Public Rights, supra note 40,
at 171 (stating that the advantage of the doctrine is to make competing interests-
public and private-"doctrinally equal"); Byrne, supra note 40, at 242 (contending
that the doctrine has "breathtaking potential" because it gives a state an overriding
property interest even if land is privately held); Hunter, supra note 40, at 378 (allows
ecological values to be protected in the public interest); Douglas L. Grant, Western
Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism About the Takings Issue,
27 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 423, 457 (1995); Gaither v. Abermarle Hosp., 70 S.E.2d 680, 692
(N.C. 1952) (stating that obstructions need not interfere with navigation, only make it
less convenient to constitute a nuisance).
84. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 450-51 (Or. 1993).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1285(a)(1).
86. 181 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999). See, e.g., Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78
F.3d 1523, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing Congress's authority to impose a
zero-discharge standard while developing a narrow exception where compliance is
impossible).
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not published discharge standards for the pollutant at issue. The
court found that there was no right to pollute, hence if there is no
standard which permits a discharge, there can be none. Even
courts hostile to environmental regulation have provided a "ra-
tional basis" for a rule of "zero pollution" by conceding that the
only demonstrably safe level of any pollutant is zero.87 This rule
is explicitly acknowledged, if widely ignored, in so-called "non-dis-
charge" permits, e.g., those issued for agricultural operations and
on-site human waste treatment systems (septic tanks). In fact, the
right of government to declare and prohibit public nuisances in
the area of public health and safety has been established literally
for hundreds of years. 8 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has
also refused to recognize a "Right to Develop," holding in Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island that the "Takings" clause of the U.S. Constitution
could be satisfied by allowing any beneficial economic use-which
dissenters thought could be as little as one residence per twenty
acres of waterfront property!8 9
IMPLEMENTATION: THE COURTS ARE THE MOST
LIKELY CANDIDATES:
Although the public awareness stirred by the Santa Barbara
oil spill, the Cuyahoga River fires and Silent Spring galvanized
Congress in the 1960's to create the grand statutory schemes that
we know as modern environmental law, and we think that protec-
tion of the public's property rights and right to clean air and water
are popular concepts, we recognize that neither the current Con-
gress nor any state legislature is likely to translate our property
rights analysis into law. On the other hand, even though the
105th Congress in the "Contract with America" vowed to repeal
what the majority called onerous environmental laws (in part be-
cause a majority favored the rights of generators), it did not hap-
pen because these laws are popular. 90 Still, we believe that the
87. Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd in part,
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
88. See, e.g., People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (Cal. 1941) (citing State v. Ehrlich,
64 S.E. 935, 940 (W. Va. 1909)).
89. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., Souter, J., &
Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. "81% of voters support stronger environmental regulations or stricter enforce-
ment of existing laws; 75% of Americans would like stronger federal environmental
protections; 84% believe that government should enact tougher pollution and emis-
sion standards on industry; 82% said that they worry personally about pollution of
drinking water, rivers, lakes and reservoirs; 78% worry personally about air pollu-
tion." League of Conservation Voters, American Voters Place a High Priority On En-
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courts are the most likely avenue to translate a property analysis
into environmental policy. The courts created this problem just
about one hundred years ago, reversing several hundred years of
prior law. They can certainly reverse course to ensure protection
of the vast majority of Americans who are receptors.
THE QUESTIONS
Large, unanswered questions remain, of course. For example,
to what entity would a generator have to demonstrate that all
costs had been internalized, and using what standard? Who pays
for the science that would be necessary? The answer may be that
it is really no different from the Bormann case, where the agency
and the legislature had to recognize the common law property
rights articulated by the courts-even though it meant re-writing
the statutes to encompass those rights.9 1 The burden should be on
the generator to demonstrate that no offsite effects would occur or
in the alternative, why a trespass should be authorized given re-
ceptors' rights, so unless one of the public or private funding
sources provided a grant, the cost of the science should also be a
cost to internalize and should therefore be borne by the generator,
just as pharmaceutical manufacturers must do under the Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act.92
Could a legislative body authorize compensation and con-
demn the property rights of receptors? While beyond the scope of
this paper, there are several sub-issues. The laws of most jurisdic-
tions require that the condemnation be for a "public purpose."
Generally, this does not mean for private profit, except in the case
of community redevelopment where a public entity condemns a
blighted area, then after improvements, sells the property to the
highest bidders to return it to the tax rolls. Would a discharge
constitute a valid public purpose? At least the debate would be
properly focused on the public value of allowing discharge. Would
a condemnation for both private profit and increased tax revenue
vironmental Protections, Despite Concerns About Energy and the Economy, at http:ll
www.lcveducation.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (citations omitted).
91. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d 309.
92. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-97
(1994 & Supp. III 1997) (statute provides for strict regulation of food, drugs, and cos-
metics); see also 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(p) (1994) (defining "new drugs" as those not yet
proven "safe and effective").
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constitute a taking of the property owner's rights? The U.S. Su-
preme Court is currently tackling this question. 93
Could legislatures fashion an exception for discharges to pub-
lic space? The laws of most if not all jurisdictions prohibit gifts of
public funds. Fair compensation would have to be paid, just as
courts require users of public trust waters (such as over-water res-
taurants) to pay.94
Another question would be how to value the interests of the
receptors, which also focuses the inquiry on the science and eco-
nomics needed to make the decision. Concededly this will be diffi-
cult at first, given the Data Deficit, but presumably both science
and economics will become better at the tasks and both camps
would like to move more quickly. Given that both have underesti-
mated the impacts of previous environmental risks, we recom-
mend that some fund or insurance pool be created to manage risks
that initial valuation may overlook. Another concept involves cre-
ating a market in pollution easements whereby generators could
acquire the right to discharge into the air and water-but only if
the receptors acting in the market receive acceptable compensa-
tion. Here, again, landowners and their representatives, scien-
tists and economists must have the data. Perhaps there could be
intervention by government to condemn rights of recalcitrant
owners once a set percentage of approvals are secured.
Other issues include whether the concepts would apply only
to point sources or also non-point sources. The answer would
seem to be in the affirmative, since non-point sources are really
only point sources that either have not been identified or which
are dispersed throughout a property so that there is discharge but
no pipe. In many of these cases, simple instrumentation, such as
monitoring wells, can detect the actual flow. Would it affect power
plants? Why not? Mobile sources? Mobile sources are property.95
93. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 159 L.
Ed. 2d 857 (2004).
94. See, e.g., N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7M.0601 (July 2001) (prohibiting float-
ing structures that infringe on the public trust rights); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 397, 437 (1892); Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Some Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 423, 457 (1995);
Gaither v. Albemarle Hosp., 70 S.E.2d 680, 692 (N.C. 1952) (stating that obstructions
need not interfere with navigation, only make it less convenient to constitute a
nuisance).
95. Borland, 369 So. 2d at 530.
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THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK DOES
NOT ACCOMPLISH THESE GOALS.
The truth is that existing environmental statutes permit pol-
lution and allow externalities. Politics and the budget deficits
have limited critical data and limited enforcement efforts so that
the resulting framework focuses on cost and feasibility to the gen-
erator rather than the impact on receptors. The first step is to
quantify all the costs of pollution. This is difficult to do, given the
Data Deficit, so there is much work for scientists and economists.
Technology-based and Risk-based systems do not completely
internalize costs because they focus on feasibility and cost to pro-
ducers and generators, and not on quantifying and internalizing
externalities. At best, the systems attempt to weigh costs against
benefits, which ignores the pivotal market requirement to inter-
nalize costs completely before weighing benefits of the economic
activity. Of course, without adequate data, it is difficult to quan-
tify true costs and without true costs the benefits cannot be accu-
rately balanced in any event. Using "Available Technology"
standards, which includes a number of variants, from "Best Avail-
able" to "Maximum Available" (and even the agricultural stan-
dard, "Best Management Practices"), (a) is subject to substantial
discretion; (b) fails to force technological innovation (as the 1975-
76 California auto emissions standards did); and (c) feasibility of
technology or practices is related to the issue of the harm caused
only to the extent that use of some form of BAT might result in
partial internalization of costs. 96
Risk-based systems require data, which often do not exist, and
depend ultimately on a judgment as to whose asthmatic child or
grandparent should be sacrificed? The familiar formula for Risk
Assessment is: Hazard Identification; Dose-response Assessment;
Exposure Assessment; and Risk Characterization. 97 The final step
96. During the controversy over California's 1975-1976 new vehicle emissions
standards, Honda proved that the standards could be met despite the protest of De-
troit that they were unattainable. Richard Halloran, New Honda Engine Can Meet
U.S. Anti-Pollution Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1973, at 39. A new controversy has just
erupted over California's new "greenhouse gas" motor vehicle emissions limitations,
which manufacturers again contend they cannot meet. See also Cal. Air Res. Bd.,
Regulatory Documents for the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles, at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/grnhsgas/grnhsgas.htm (last updated Oct. 19, 2004);
John DeCicco et al., Environmental Defense, Automaker Carbon Burdens in Califor-
nia, at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/pdf.cfm?ContentID=3986&FileName=
caautocarbonburden.pdf (Sept.17, 2004).
97. These four tests are from the National Academy of Sciences and are used ex-
tensively. See, e.g., EPA, EPA Pollution Prevention (P2) Framework, at http://www.
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clearly involves a value judgment as to the relative severity of the
risk, thus this is a subjective, not a purely "scientific" process or
objective process. As now Justice Breyer wrote in 1993, there are
widely differing perspectives on the nature and significance of
even common risks.98 Further, William Ruckelshaus, President
Nixon's EPA Administrator, argues that risk assessment is often
confused with risk management, where political judgments inter-
cede 99 . The Data Deficit also factors heavily: Graham, et al., note,
"Our view is that risk assessment has become too formalized and
mechanical in light of the limited data. Little is gained from so-
phisticated massaging of weak data."1° ° Thus, the risk manage-
ment process does not internalize costs completely because it
relies upon value judgments as to acceptable levels of damage that
are grounded on inadequate data.1° 1 Moreover, there are seldom
allowances made for the estimates and value judgments if they
prove to be incorrect, such as a damage fund or dispute mecha-
epa.gov/oppt/p2framework/images/p2man0l0300l020intromodelsepi.pdf (Oct. 2003).
EPA's Risk & Decision Making (1992) and Guidance for Risk Characterization (1995)
both provide a description of the components of risk assessment. EPA's Children's
Health Valuation Handbook (Oct. 2003), adds two factors for environmental econom-
ics studies:
"QUANTIFICATION OF WELFARE EFFECTS: Specifying the ways in which
changes in children's health affect welfare. These may include impacts on
school attendance, parents' attendance at work, medical expenditures,
pain and suffering endured, etc. VALUATION OF THE WELFARE EFFECTS:
Monetizing the expected changes in welfare using appropriate economic
techniques. If monetization is impractical, alternatives including simple
health effect inventories are considered. Generally, the first four steps of
the process (hazard identification through risk characterization) fall
under the realm of risk assessment. In the final two steps, quantification
and valuation of the welfare effects, economists use estimates provided by
risk assessors and produce monetary values of the expected changes in
welfare."
Richard E. Just et al., WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY: A PRACTICAL AP-
PROACH TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION (Edward Elgar 2004).
98. Stephen Breyer, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REG-
ULATION (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
99. Ruckelshaus, "Risk, Science and Democracy", Issues in Science and Technol-
ogy, Spring 1985, pp. 19-38.
100. Graham et al., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CHEMICALS AND CANCER RISK (Harvard
Univ. Press 1998).
101. We recognize that even if all costs were completely internalized and there
were no uncertainty, there would still be political/ethical/equity decisions to make-
i.e., do you spend the last $100 on cancer research or AIDS research? Economics will
never enable us to avoid equity tradeoffs, it just tries to clarify the tradeoffs and to
help us make the tradeoffs efficiently/without waste. However, until true costs are
identified, internalization-or subsidization if that is the political choice-cannot oc-
cur accurately.
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nism.10 2 As the courts have said, the only sure method to elimi-
nate the risk inherent in externalities (and therefore internalize
costs) is to have zero discharge.' 0 3
Market-based strategies at present include, (1) emissions trad-
ing systems, although only the sulfur dioxide air market is in
place; and (2) emissions charges. 10 4 While theoretically attractive,
there are significant concerns. First, economic efficiency is not the
only factor in any determination of the greatest good, especially if
the analysis is based on deficient data and incomplete analysis.
Equity must also be considered. Emissions trading requires a de-
termination (utilizing traditional methods and existing deficient
data) of some level of pollution acceptable to the regulatory
agency, which then becomes a "cap". Then there must be a judg-
ment call (as has been done by EPA in the S02 and NOx market)
as to which existing and future dischargers get what "rights" to
pollute. 0 5 For example, the EPA recently issued a rule permit-
ting trading of mercury emissions, which requires a nationwide
"cap" on total emissions 0 6. Thus unless market participants
other than generators purchase and retire the "rights", there is
only a reduction in pollution below the cap if mandated by stat-
utes or rule, and without a reduction, this system sanctions rather
than eliminates externalities. EPA even admits that, ". . .elimi-
nating localized concentrations of pollution is not [the] primary
purpose [of cap and trade programs] 107."
Emissions charges require some determination of the actual
costs of pollution to provide the correct incentive for generators to
102. An exception is the damage fund for cleaning up leaking underground gaso-
line storage tanks, and there is extensive theoretical work on the economics of assur-
ance bonds and how these could be used as damage funds and to provide incentives to
avoid/prevent spills/damages.
103. Am. Trucking Ass'n., 175 F.3d at 1037.
104. C. William Simmons & Robert H. Cutting, Jr., A Many-Layered Wonder.- Non-
Vehicular Air Pollution Control in California, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 109, 113 (1975); J.H.
DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 7-8 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1968).
105. The permits could be sold or auctioned off by the government, or the govern-
ment could give them to the potential "victims," who could then decide whether to sell
them to the potential polluters, thus financing movement of the victims "out of harm's
way," or the victims could decide to keep the permits and not sell them to the pol-
luters, which effectively would eliminate pollution in that area, either by disallowing
the activity that causes pollution, or by indirectly forcing the potential polluters to
find some alternative means of production/recycling that does not result in pollution.
106. 40 CFR Parts 60, 63, 72, and 75, [OAR-2002-0056; FRL-] RIN 2060-AJ65
(March 15, 2005); see also discussion by EPA at: http://www.epa.gov/mercuryrule/
rule.htm (last visited April 22, 2005).
107. http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/capandtrade/ctessentials.pdf (last visited
April 22, 2005).
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reduce pollution to the point where the incremental benefits of re-
duction equal the incremental costs, sometimes coupled with a
method to redistribute the costs from generators to those recep-
tors who are damaged (the "charges"). The Data Deficit makes
this difficult, although assuming the mechanism for assessment
and redistribution is accurate, it would address the externalities
issue more completely than most solutions.
Private Rights of Action: Use of the courts results only in
case-by-case internalization, which does not completely internal-
ize costs. Huge transactional costs (attorneys, experts, time) often
fall on those least able to pay, ensuring that not all claims are
litigated.10 8 The process is also fraught with uncertainty, given
the jury system, and that the generator's conduct must often be
found to be "unreasonable", hardly an objective standard. 10 9
Moreover, the rights of individuals to press legal claims for re-
dress and damages are often limited by statute and court
interpretations. 110
Government has greatly hamstrung the market's ability to
encourage pollution prevention and discourage polluting activities
by permitting externalities. The famous "invisible hand" property
of markets, the behavior that usually guides society toward effi-
ciency, is short-circuited by externalities, with the result that the
108. See A CIVIL ACTION (Buena Vista Studios 1998) (depicting the infamous toxic
pollution case in Woburn, Mass.); ERIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Pictures 2000) (de-
picting the Pacific Gas & Electric water pollution case in California). U.S. Gen. Ac-
counting Office, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and their Correlation with
Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities, Gao/Rced-83-168, B-
211461 (June 1, 1983) available at http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/121648.pdf, Comm'n
For Racial Justice & United Church Of Christ, Toxic Waste and Race in the United
States: National Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communi-
ties with Hazardous Waste Sites (Public Access Data 1987); JAY M. GOULD, QUALITY
OF LIFE IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS, LEVELS OF AFFLUENCE, Toxic WASTE, AND CAN-
CER MORTALITY IN RESIDENTIAL ZIP CODE AREAS (1986); ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING
IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN,
THE TRUTH ABOUT WHERE You LIVE: AN ATLAS FOR ACTION ON ToxiNs AND MORTALITY
(1991); Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in
Environmental Law: A Special Investigation, NAT'L L.J., S1 (Sept. 21, 1992); Exec.
Order No. 12,898, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 (Jan. 30, 1995).
109. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 524, 527-28 (1982).
110. The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently held that the state's Clean
Water Act limited the right to sue polluters for public nuisance only to the state gov-
ernment, not private individuals or organizations, even if they claimed specific harm.
Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 48 (NC. Ct. App. 2002);
but see Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (taking a
more relaxed approach to standing requirements, holding that environmental groups
do not need to allege specific harm to the environment).
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public is forced to subsidize the producers. If the market is to be
ignored, the process should be far more transparent.
CONCLUSION: REACHING THE GOAL:
Simply, shift the burden to the polluter to demonstrate that
all externalities have been internalized. Thus, each permit holder
or applicant would start with a zero-based pollution budget, much
as accountants utilize zero-based budgeting to force business or
government to justify each expenditure in a budget cycle. This
would require truly sound science, funded by the proposed genera-
tor, to justify the conclusion that pollution had been internalized.
Steps could include:
1. Permit Review: All permits should be re-opened to include:
a. Shift of the Burden of Proof to the Polluter to demonstrate
that all costs of waste disposal have been internalized, in-
cluding any invasions of receptors' property rights;
b. Harm-based regulations for interim standards, including
increased funding for basic scientific research and techni-
cal assistance;
c. Time to convert the system: but not the usual extensive
time because the trespass to other properties is critical
and should be paramount, and because to ignore those
rights would expose the jurisdiction to a Takings claim by
the receptor landowners and occupiers.
2. Enforcement: Given that there will never be enough re-
sources for enforcement, initiate:
a. Remote Sensing: common for in-stack air monitoring, it
eliminates the inherit untrustworthiness of self-reporting
as on the DMR's (daily monitoring reports) required for
dischargers to surface waters. Monitoring wells, for exam-
ple, are often inexpensive means to gauge offsite trans-
port-but in North Carolina, for example, the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources will not require
wells even for intensive livestock operations .111 This
technology is largely available now-and the science could
be sped up.
111. See Lawrence B. Cahoon, et al., Nitrogen and Phosphorus Imports to the Cape
Fear and Neuse River Basins to Support Intensive Livestock Production, 33 ENVTL.
Sci. TECH. 410, 410 (1999) (discussing nutrient loading); see also Pat Stith & Joby
Warrick, Boss Hog, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 19-26, 1995, available at http:ll
www.pulitzer.org/year/1996/public-service/works/about.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2004) (a Pulitzer-prize winning series on hog farm pollution, corporate farming, and
politics).
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b. Real-Time Reporting: A system of web entry of the data
for required reporting to agencies, for example that would
with one simple and secure entry, transmit data that is
public to the agency (or at least a clearinghouse), where it
would be simultaneously posted to the web, sent to appro-
priate officials, and automatically acknowledged. Data re-
ports and enforcement memos could automatically be
generated. This, too, is available NOW through Cold Fu-
sion and other database-to-web programs.
1 12
c. Accessible Public Records: A national (and international)
clearinghouse could easily be created that would be
searchable by industry, company or product, and which
would contain (1) information on current pollution, (2) in-
formation on cases, administrative actions and other en-
forcement procedures, as well as (3) information on
participation in pollution reduction programs. A consumer
or an investor could access the database even in stores and
vote for those who demonstrate clean environmental
records every time they shop. Clearly, people vote more
often with their pocketbooks than at the polls, and the
marketplace is supposed to include transactions between
an informed seller and an informed buyer, so the impact
would likely be far greater than any regulatory regime.
Moreover, preliminary studies indicate that data have a
demonstrable effect on both compliance by the regulated
entity and on investors. 1 13 The data are public record
now, but difficult to manipulate unless an initial commit-
ment of resources were made.
3. GATT/NAFTA/CAFTA: We join those who recommend modi-
fication of the trade pacts to establish that nations may limit
112. In fact, efforts are underway to form the National Environmental Information
Exchange Network, through EPA and ECOS (the Environmental Council of States),
but implementation will take some time given the current funding and even then the
public may not easily be able to access the data. See R. Steven Brown and Valerie
Green, Environmental Council of the States, Report to Congress: State Environmental
Contributions to Enforcement and Compliance (2001), available at http:/ /www.sso.
org /ecos /projects /Enforcement /ECOSFull%2OEnf%2OReport.pdf. Mr. Cutting and
an undergraduate student put such a generic program together using Cold Fusion as
early as 2000.
113. See, e.g., Madhu Khanna et al., Toxic Release Information: a Policy Tool for
Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 243-246 (1998);
Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Commu-
nity Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT 109, 109-
124 (1997); Jerome Foulon et al., Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or Infor-
mation?, 44 J. ENVL. ECON. & MGMT 169, 169-187 (2002); James T. Hamilton, Pollu-
tion as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data,
28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT 98, 98-113 (1995).
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access to their markets for entities that operate under less
stringent environmental regulations. 114 Commonly, genera-
tors move from jurisdictions with more stringent pollution
control laws to areas with few laws or lax enforcement and
thereby achieve significant cost reductions, and thereby cre-
ate market pressure to loosen laws even further. An example
close to home is the U.S. border with Mexico, where U.S.
companies have simply moved from the U.S. to the Mexican
side of the Rio Grande, and where Mexican enforcement of
environmental regulations has historically been lax (The Ma-
quiladora phenomena). 115 The pollutants are discharged to
the same surface water body, thereby creating pollution
problems in the U.S. over which the U.S. has little control.
Why should entities that move offshore to avoid more strin-
gent pollution control rules enjoy any advantage for evading
measures intended to protect the planet's resources and envi-
ronment? Such measures do not restrict the options of na-
tions who choose to allow pollution. But other nations could
agree that business entities that evade environmental rules
are engaging in unfair business practices, which entitle na-
tions to exclude products, services and even the companies
themselves. Foreign entities have already charged that U.S.
laws designed to provide environmental protection constitute
barriers to trade. A nation that restricts products because of
the manner in which they are produced is now accused of an
unfair trade practice, as the World Trade Organization arbi-
trators held when tuna which was caught without dolphin-
friendly gear was excluded from U.S. sale under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act. 1 6 Other nations have even chal-
114. See, e.g., PATRICK WOODALL, SIERRA CLUB, WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO
GOOD LAWS: How INTERNATIONAL TRADE PACTS THREATEN CALIFORNIA'S ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAWS (2004), at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/California; Sierra Club, A Fair
Trade Bill of Rights, http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/ftaa/rights.asp (last visited Nov.
10, 2004).
115. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Southern Plains Regional Issues: International Issues,
at http://www.sierraclub.orglfield/southernplains/issues/international.asp (last vis-
ited Oct. 17, 2004) (and other materials linked to that site). The NAFTA included a
side agreement on environment, but the results are still both unpredictable and un-
clear. See, e.g., MARY TIEMANN, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, NAFTA: RELATED ENVIRONMEN-
TAL ISSUES AND INITIATIVES, at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/6143.htm (last updated Mar.
2000).
116. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Dispute Settlement Panel
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991); See
also, e.g., Donald McRae, Trade and the Environment: Competition, Cooperation or
Confusion?, 41 ALBERTA L. REV. 745, (2003); see also Woodall, supra note 104; GREG
PALAST, THE BEST DEMOCRACY MONEY CAN Buy (2002); Paul Krugman, Enemies of the
WTO: Bogus arguments against the World Trade Organization, MSN SLATE MAGA-
ZrNE, Nov. 24, 1999, at http://slate.msn.com/id/56497.
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lenged "eco-labeling" requirements to provide consumers
with information about products in the U.S. marketplace.' 1 7
Even so, it seems to us that any entity that imports materials
manufactured offshore could easily be required to post real-
time data on the environmental record of any facility used in
its processes, so at very least the public could decide which
entities deserve consumer support.
The "outsourcing" phenomenon is then used to convince states
and local jurisdictions to swallow more pollution rather than risk
job loss. Another method to reduce some of the pressure on do-
mestic jurisdictions would be to eliminate the current tax breaks
for the practice.
Someday, politicians may recognize that (1) receptors are far
more numerous than generators - although receptors may not
contribute as much to campaigns, knowledge of pollution practices
may energize them to vote or buy differently if the information is
available; (2) Keeping pollutants out of receptors' property pro-
tects health, as well as property rights; and (3) these are popular
concerns. We have a choice: do it now for future generations (a
true "Family Value"), or let those generations judge us based on
the waste from production and the wastes the transitory products
become that we have left them.
117. See Margrete Strand, Poisoned Workers, Poisoned Fields, Sierra Club, at
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/environment/poisoned.asp (last visited Nov. 11,
2004); Sierra Club, A Fair Trade Bill of Rights, at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/
ftaa/rights.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
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